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Bearded Ladies Walking on the 
Brooklyn Bridge 
David G. Epstein* and Yvette Joy Liebesman** 
Prologue-Dick Atkinson Memories 
Remembering Dick is easy. He was unique-a unique 
combination of charm, consideration, intelligence. He was such 
a vivid person that memories are vivid. 
I remember living in Dick's house on Gray when I came to 
Fayetteville. Our house on Woolsey Road-which surely must 
have been the inspiration for the PBS "This Old House" series-
was in the process of being put back together, and Dick 
graciously offered to share his house with me. And what a 
wonderful house. Like Dick, it was a combination of what's 
best about small towns in the South and the big cities of the 
East--comfortable, yet elegant. As memorable as the house 
* I teach at the Dedman School of Law of Southern Methodist University and am 
grateful for the opportunity to work with SMU students and a wonderful research librarian, 
Laura Justiss. I am also grateful for the many other professional opportunities that I have 
had, including teaching Yvette and 110 other students contracts at the Georgetown 
University Law Center. 
I am especially grateful to the University of Arkansas School of Law, which gave 
me the opportunity to serve as Dean and is now giving me the opportunity to participate in 
this Arkansas Law Review issue honoring Dick Atkinson. While I was Dean, I did not 
appreciate how important Dick was to the Law School-how much he helped students, 
staff, and faculty, what a difference he made in the lives of people at the Law School. I 
regret that I did not properly recognize and reward him-not that recognition or reward 
was ever important to Dick. 
•• I am a fourth-year (evening) student at the Georgetown University Law Center and 
eagerly anticipate a May 2006 graduation. Next year, I will be serving as a law clerk for 
the Honorable Helen E. Hoens of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. I am 
grateful for the opportunity to work with such wonderful faculty as Professor Epstein 
throughout my law school career and hope to continue to do so for many years. While I 
never had the pleasure of meeting Dean Atkinson, I am honored to have the opportunity to 
be associated with this tribute to him. 
We would also like to thank the participants of the faculty workshops at Emory 
Law School, Dedman School of Law of Southern Methodist University, and Wake Forest 
School of Law for their valuable input and suggestions. 
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was, even more memorable was the constant stream of people at 
the house. 
There was also a constant stream of students in and out of 
Dick's office. I remember being in Dick's office at the Law 
School on one of those rare occasions that the office was not full 
. of students. I was concerned about a student-about whether a 
troubled student might be suicidal. I had talked with Jim Miller 
about the student, and Miller suggested that I talk with Dick. As 
always, Miller's advice was good advice. Dick had noticed the 
problem long before I had and was already spending extra time 
with the student. 
And, I remember more recently meeting Dick at a Law 
School alumni meeting here in Dallas. So easy for a Dean at 
that kind of function to spend all of his time with the major 
donor prospects and ignore everybody else. Not Dick. He made 
each person there-including Diane and me-feel as though he 
or she were the most interesting and important person that Dick 
had ever met. 
Remembering Dick makes you feel good. Think about it. 
Every memory of Dick is a good memory. He could be so much 
fun to be with. He could make you realize how good people can 
be, how nice it is to be nice. 
Remembering Dick feels "right." While the memorial 
service for Dick was wonderful (http://law.uark.edu/atkinson/vi 
deo.htm), and I am sure that the new sculpture garden and this 
memorial issue of the law review will be also, for the thousands 
of people who knew him, the most lasting memorial to Dick 
Atkinson will be our memories of Dick. 
DGE 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following "law school" hypotheticals: 1 
1. 0 sends the following email to A: "Understand you 
painted my neighbor's fence for $1000. Will pay you 
$1200 if you paint my fence before the end of the 
month." 
2. 0 sends the following email to A: "Understand that 
you painted my neighbor's fence for $1000. Will pay 
you $1200 if you paint my fence before the end of the 
month and this offer can be accepted only by painting 
the fence and not by promising to paint the fence." 
If A flawlessly paints the fence before the end of the 
month, is there a contract in #1? In #2? If so, which of the 
contracts are unilateral contracts? Does it matter? Why? 
Shouldn't A have a right to be paid $1200 for her painting work 
regardless of whether she promised before she painted? 
If A paints the fence before the end of the month with 
minor flaws that 0 can fix for $100, is there a contract in # 1? In 
#2? If so, which of the contracts are unilateral contracts? Does 
it matter? Why? 
If, instead, A starts painting the fence but is then notified 
by 0 that "I have changed my mind about having the fence 
painted-the deal is off," can A then collect from 0 for breach 
of contract in # 1? In #2? Does the law of unilateral contracts 
affect any of your answers to these questions? 
Or, if A starts painting the fence and then stops, and O's 
costs in having another painter finish painting the fence are 
$1400, can 0 recover $200 from A in #1? In #2? Again, does 
the law of unilateral contracts affect any of your answers to 
these questions? 
Is there still a "law" of unilateral contracts? If so, when is 
it helpful? 
1. Your authors disagree as to whether these very hypotheticals were used in our 
contracts class at the Georgetown University Law Center in the spring of2003. We agree, 
however, that a series of law school hypotheticals is an appropriate beginning for an article 
on the distinction between bilateral and unilateral contracts, as the distinction was 
originally established in law school class material and today should be material primarily 
used in law school classes. 
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Similar questions about unilateral contracts are regularly 
asked by law professors in their first-year contracts classes. In 
looking for answers, students find no help in the American Law 
Institute's ("ALI") Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
("Restatement Second"). For more than twenty-five years, there 
has not been a "law" of unilateral contracts in the Restatement 
Second. In 1979, the ALI approved the Restatement Second. 
Professor Robert Braucher, the Reporter for the early drafts of 
the Restatement Second, 2 described its "main innovations ... as 
stylistic rather than substantive. "3 One such innovation was the 
deletion of definitions of "bilateral contract" and "unilateral 
contract" from the statement of the rules. 4 Although the writers 
of the restatements have apparently stopped using the terms 
"bilateral contract" and "unilateral contract," the writers of both 
reported opinions and materials on contract law continue to use 
the terms. Different writers have different definitions of the 
terms. 
In most of the recent reported cases that use either of the 
terms, however defined, the use is obiter dictum. And, in those 
opinions that base a holding on some distinction between 
"bilateral contract" and "unilateral contract," there is generally a 
more sound basis for the holding. This article discusses the 
post-Restatement Second use, misuse, and abuse of the terms 
"bilateral contract" and "unilateral contract" and answers the 
hypotheticals in the first paragraphs of the article. 
II. THE BILATERAL/UNILATERAL DISTINCTION 
BEFORE THE RESTATEMENT SECOND 
Just as the Second Restatement did not end the 
bilateral/unilateral distinction, the "First" Restatement did not 
begin the distinction. Langdell did. 
2. Lance Liebman, Allan Farnsworth, ALI Reporter, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1429, 1429 
& n. l (2005). Professor Robert Braucher served as Reporter for the Restatement Second 
until he was appointed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1971. Id. 
Thereafter, Professor Allan Farnsworth served as Reporter. See id. at 1429. 
3. Robert Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 
302, 303 (1964). Professor Lance Liebman, Director of the ALI, describes the Restatement 
Second somewhat differently: "No ALI work comes closer to the goals of the Institute's 
founders .... " Liebman, supra note 2, at 1429. 
4. Braucher, supra note 3, at 304. 
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A. Christopher Columbus Langdell's 
"Unilateral Contract" and Before 
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Starting with Professor Williston, law professors have 
"credited" Professor Langdell with popularizing the terms 
"bilateral contract" and "unilateral contract. "5 Lang dell did not 
use these words in the first edition of his contracts casebook, A 
Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts. 6 Indeed, that 1871 
edition had none of Langdell's words--only a few hundred 
cases, without commentary. 7 
The 1879 second edition of the Langdell casebook 
contained not only most of the same cases as the first edition, 
but also a summary written by Langdell. 8 The 250-page 
summary at the end of the casebook, like an early version of 
Gilbert's,9 was obviously written primarily to help students 
5. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 13 & n.42, at 11 (1920) 
[hereinafter WILLISTON, CONTRACTS]; see also SIR WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF CONTRACT 26 & n.1 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d ed. 1919). Understand that 
Williston was not a Langdell "groupie." According to Williston, "my personal relations 
with Mr. Langdell were always so slight because of his reticent and aloof habits .... " 
SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 138 (1941) [hereinafter 
WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW]. Keener, not Langdell, taught Williston contracts. Id. at 75. 
President Charles Eliot, not Dean Langdell, offered Williston his first teaching job. Id. at 
129. Williston's first article was critical of Langdell. See Samuel Williston, Successive 
Promises of the Same Performance, 8 HARV. L. REV. 27, 32-38 (1894) (describing 
Professor Langdell' s distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts and noting that 
there "is but one case in which the court takes the distinction"). One ofLangdell's few law 
review articles was critical of Williston's criticism. See C.C. Langdell, Mutual Promises 
as a Consideration for Each Other, 14 HARV. L. REV. 496, 498 (1901) (arguing that 
Professor Williston's article came close to calling him "either incompetent or dishonest"). 
We particularly like the footnote in which Langdell responds to the unasked but obvious 
question of why he waited seven years to respond to Williston' s article published in their 
law school's law review: "it was not till about a year ago that my attention was first called 
to the article." Id. at 498 n.1. 
6. See c.c. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LA w OF CONTRACTS (1871 ). 
7. See id. at xiii-xvi. Obviously, the preface and the index had Langdell's words, but 
not the words "bilateral contract" or ''unilateral contract." See id. at v-vii, xiii-xvi. In a 
review of Langdell's contracts casebook, the index was described as "suggestive matter 
hidden away there in a few lines ... to be found by the careful student." Book Notices, 14 
AM. L. REV. 233, 233 (1880). 
8. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 985-1094 
(2d ed. 1879) [hereinafter LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES (2d ed.)]. With minor 
revisions, the summary was separately published as C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE 
LA w OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1880) [hereinafter LANGDELL, SUMMARY]. 
9. Generations of law students have wrongly blamed Langdell for inventing 
casebooks instead of praising Langdell for "inventing" Gilbert's. Cf JAMES WILLARD 
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW.: THE LAW MAKERS 261 (1950) (crediting John 
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learn contract law from the casebook. 10 The summary, focusing 
primarily on the cases listed, covered the areas of contract law 
that were covered in the casebook. 11 LangdeH organized the 
summary differently from the casebook. Both editions of the 
casebook had three chapters: (1) Mutual Consent, 
(2) Consideration, and (3) Conditional Contracts. The summary 
is organized around sixteen "titles," arranged in alphabetical 
order, starting with the title "Acceptance of Offer" and ending 
with the title "Unilateral and Bilateral Contracts." 12 Langdell 
did not wait until this last title to mention "bilateral contracts" 
and "unilateral contracts"; throughout, Langdell discusses what 
makes a contract "bilateral" and what makes a contract 
"unilateral."13 Langdell's use of the terms "bilateral contracts" 
and "unilateral contracts" begins in the title "Acceptance of 
Offer" with this comparison: "in a unilateral contract the offer 
becomes a contract in consequence of what the offeree does, in a 
bilateral contract in consequence of what he says." 14 Langdell 
thus distinguishes bilateral contracts from unilateral contracts on 
the basis of what the offeree does or says rather than on the basis 
of what the offeror said. In summary, Langdell would find a 
unilateral contract in both of our introductory hypotheticals if A 
painted the fence. 
Norton Pomeroy for using cases for law teaching in the 1860s); see also WILLISTON, LIFE 
AND LAW, supra note 5, at 205 ("It is chiefly due to Ames that the case method of study 
developed into a case method of teaching. At any rate, after his first years at the School, 
Langdell's increasingly defective eyesight led him to teach exclusively by lectures."). 
10. Book Notices, supra note 7, at 234 ("[I]t is to be remembered that the book is 
published for use at a law school, and that for that purpose dogmatic teaching is a 
necessity, if any thing is to be taught within the limited time of a student's course."). 
11. See Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An 
Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 547, 602 ("[T]he 
narrative was only a summary of the law reflected in the cases in the casebook, not a 
summary of the field of contracts as a whole."). 
12. See generally LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8. There is one separate section 
entitled "Unilateral Contracts and Bilateral Contracts." Id. at§ 183, at 248. We mention 
this for readers who adhere to Professor Gilmore's view that Langdell was "an essentially 
stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with 
all the tenacity of genius." GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977). 
For a more generous view of Langdell and his work, see Bruce A. Kimball, The Langdell 
Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 
277 (2004) ("Langdell thus transformed legal education from an undemanding, 
gentlemanly acculturation into an academic meritocracy."). 
13. See generally LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8. 
14. Id. at§ 12, at 13. 
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Although Langdell's Summary was written for law 
students, it was also used and cited by courts writing opinions 
and law professors writing books and articles. It was urged in 
an 1880 review of his casebook: "for even if Mr. Langdell's 
results should hereafter be overruled in particular cases, they 
will have done very nearly as much to advance the law as if they 
had been adopted. For the1' must be either adopted or refuted, 
they cannot be passed by." 1 
In the main, courts and commentators accepted Langdell's 
"result" that a contract could be created by the off eree' s doing 
what the offer required without the offeree first expressly 
promising that he would do what the offer required. Obviously 
there were cases and legal commentaries after 1880 that "passed 
by" Langdell' s "results" on bilateral contracts and unilateral 
contracts by not using the terms, 16 and, to the extent that 
Langdell's "results" on bilateral contracts and unilateral 
contracts were expressly "refuted," the focus was on Langdell's 
choice of the term "unilateral contract." 17 · Other cases and 
commentaries used the term "unilateral contract" in a manner 
15. Book Notices, supra note 7, at 235. That same year, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr.-not yet forty, not yet a judge or even a professor---delivered twelve lectures that were 
published the next year as The Common Law. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW{5lst prtg. 1881). 
16. The West Hombook Series (the second edition of Clark on Contracts), without 
using the term "unilateral contract" or citing to Langdell 's Summary, states, "if the offer 
contemplates the doing or forbearance from the doing of an act as the consideration of the 
promise of the offeror, unless the offer prescribes communication, the mere performance of 
the consideration completes the contract." FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS 23 (2d ed. 1904) (For those who remember Clarkv. West, 86 N.E. 1 (N.Y. 
1908), and the dispute as to whether West had waived the condition that Clark abstain from 
the use of intoxicating beverages while writing for West, we note that the first edition was 
actually written by William Clark.); see also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 330, at 125 (1887) ("Ifone makes an offer to another ... and 
does not withdraw it while the other person ... does the thing, such performance carries 
with it an acceptance of the offer; and the person who made it must pay or do what he 
proposed."). 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 21, 23. Recall that Williston credited Langdell 
with only "popularizing" the term "unilateral contract." See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text. Williston credited an early Iowa case with the "earliest use of the 
words bilateral or unilateral in our law .... " WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at 11 
n.42 (citing Barrett v. Dean, 21 Iowa 423 (1866)). The civil law sometimes refers to 
bilateral contracts as "synallagmatic" contracts. See, e.g., Mitchell Franklin, Equity as 
Form: A Study of Frost v. Knight, 30 TUL. L. REV. 175, 197 (1956). 
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different from Langdell's. 18 Professor William Herbert Page 
objected to Langdell's use of the name unilateral contract for 
contracts "created by performing the act required for acceptance 
of the offer" because of these other uses: 
The objection to [the term "unilateral contract"] is that it is 
already used too much, with too many meanings .... 
An offer for value is spoken of as a unilateral contract 
before acceptance . . . . A gratuitous promise is often 
spoken of as unilateral . . . . The term often imports an 
unenforceable promise, as distinguished from one that is 
enforceable .... As a result of these uses of the term, it is 
said that a contract can not be unilateral if it is really a 
contract. Even if the courts are speaking of a unilateral 
contract, they are likely to use the term "unilateral" of the 
offer rather than of the contract, and to say that when it 
becomes a contract it ceases to be unilateral. 19 
The Supreme Court of Kansas20 was more direct and more 
succinct in refuting Langdell's use of the term "unilateral 
contract" to describe a transaction in which the offer becomes a 
contract in consequence of what the offeree does: "A unilateral 
contract is exactly as impossible as any other one-sided thing of 
two sides."21 John S. Ewart, a prominent Canadian lawyer in 
the first part of the twentieth century,22 made the same point 
18. See, e.g., Berry v. Foley, 48 A. 146, 149 (Md. 1901) ("[T]he contract and sale ... 
was not a unilateral contract, but one that was binding upon both parties."); E.C. Dailey 
Co. v. Clark Can Co., 87 N.W. 761, 762 (Mich. 1901) ("[W]ritten proposal and acceptance 
constituted not a mutual, but a unilateral, contract ... . ");see also l WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 14, at 16 (1913) ("[W]here there is no seal 
and no consideration, while an agreement or a promise so accepted by the promisee as to 
impose no liability upon him is often called a unilateral contract, and not generally 
enforcible, it is for that very reason no true contract at all."). 
19. l WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 51, at 65-67 (2d ed. 
1920) (footnotes omitted). 
20. The judges on the Kansas Supreme Court would have had access to Langdell's 
Summary while learning and practicing law. See Robert A. Mead & M.H. Hoeflich, 
Lawyers and Law Books in Nineteenth-Century Kansas, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1051, 1059-60 
(2002). The 1886 catalogue of Crane & Company, a Topeka, Kansas, bookseller and 
publisher, includes Langdell's Summary. Id. at 1059-61 & n.39. 
21. Railsback v. Raines, 203 P. 687, 688 (Kan. 1922); see also High Wheel Auto 
Parts Co. v. Journal Co. of Troy, 98 N.E. 442, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1912) ("A unilateral 
contract is a legal solecism. There is no such thing as a one-sided contract."). 
22. See 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CANADA 305 (W. Stewart Wallace ed., 1940); 
Marionapolis College, Quebec History, http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/ency 
clopedia/JohnS.Ewart-Wallace.htrn (last visited May 24, 2006). 
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more emphatically in the Harvard Law Review: "Nobody would 
call a monologue a unilateral conversation, or a soprano solo a 
unilateral duet, or a lecture a unilateral debate .... [A] promise 
is always unilateral, and a contract is always bilateral at least."23 
In the most influential contracts treatises of the era, 
however, there was not even a "unilateral debate" over whether 
a contract could be based on performance and whether such a 
contract was to be referred to as a "unilateral contract" as 
distinguished from a "bilateral contract"; Williston's treatise 
described this distinction as "vital."24 Similarly, Corbin, in his 
American edition of the Anson treatise, distinguishes between 
"unilateral contracts" and "bilateral contracts" and calls the 
distinction "important."25 And, as early as 1897, Bouvier's Law 
Dictionary defined the term "unilateral contract" by referencing 
Langdell's Summary. 26 
B. Isaac Maurice Wormser's "Brooklyn Bridge" and After 
While there was no debate as to the legal consequences of 
an offeree's completing the performance requested by the 
offeror, there was considerable debate as to the consequences of 
an offeree's beginning the performance requested by the offeror. 
Some argued that it had no consequence: the offeror could still 
revoke his offer, and the offeree was not obligated to complete 
performance.27 Others contended that the offeree's beginning 
the performance created a contract, so the off eror could not 
revoke, and the offeree was obligated to complete the 
23. John S. Ewart, Book Review, 33 HARV. L. REV. 626, 627 (1920) (reviewing 
ANSON, supra note 5). This issue of the Harvard Law Review contains an article about 
"Professor Langdell's services to the Harvard Law School." Franklin G. Fessenden, The 
Rebirt'h of the Harvard Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 493, 493 (1920). According to a 
recent Canadian text, contracts based on the offeree's performance "have long been 
designated as 'unilateral' contracts." G.H.L. FRIDMAN, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN 
CANADA 76-77 (4th ed. 1999). 
24. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, supra note 5, at § 13, at 11. 
25. ANSON, supra note 5, at 25. 
26. 2 BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157-58 (Francis Rawle ed., 1897) (citing 
LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at § 183, at 248). 
27. See, e.g., LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8, at§ 86, at 106; SIR FREDERICK 
POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 349 (Gustavus H. Wald & 
Samuel Williston eds., 3d ed. 1906) [hereinafter POLLOCK, AT LA w AND IN EQUITY]. 
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performance. 28 Still others took a third position: the offeree's 
beginning the performance prevented the offeror from revoking, 
but did not obligate the offeree to complete the performance. 29 
Professor Wormser30 framed the debate with this now 
famous Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical: 31 
Suppose A says to B, "I will give you $100 if you walk 
across the Brooklyn Bridge" .... 
B starts to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge and has gone 
about one-half of the way across. At that moment A 
overtakes Band says to him, "I withdraw my offer." Has B 
then any rights against A ?32 
28. See, e.g., SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 19 (P.H. 
Winfield ed., 11th ed. 1942) (mentioning the French concept of commencement 
d'execution); Henry W. Ballantine, Acceptance of Offers for Unilateral Contracts by 
Partial Performance of Service Requested, 5 MINN. L. REV. 94, 99 (1921) (describing a 
unilateral contract as a "uni-promissory or uni-obligational contract"). 
29. See, e.g., Clarence D. Ashley, Offers Calling for a Consideration Other Than a 
Counter Promise, 23 HARV. L. REV. 159, 161, 166 (1910); D.O. McGovney, Irrevocable 
Offers, 27 HARV. L. REV. 644, 655, 663 (1914). 
30. Phi Alpha Delta Fraternity of Fordham University School of Law, Biography of 
Maurice Wormser, http://www.fordhampad.com/about/wormser.php (last visited May 24, 
2006). 
31. Professor Allan Farnsworth described Wormser's Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical 
as the "most durable and influential hypothetical in American legal education." l E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS§ 3.24, at 356 (3d ed. 2004). There 
is a suggestion in another, later article in the Yale Law Journal by an Australian law 
professor that another, earlier "classical illustration is the promise to pay a promisee $100 
if he goes to Rome, which promise (so the law holds) the promisor is entitled to revoke at 
any time before the promisee's arrival at his destination." Samuel J. Stoljar, The False 
Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE L.J. 515, 518 (1955) 
(citing Great N. Ry. v. Witham, (1873) 9 L.R.C.P. 16, 19). The cited case does mention a 
"unilateral contract'' and does state that "going to York" can result in a contract. Great N. 
Ry., 9 L.R.C.P. at 19. There is, however, no mention of Rome (or the Brooklyn Bridge), 
and no discussion of revocation. See id. Professor Patrick Atiyah also refers to "the 
famous problem of the promise to give £10 to a man if he walks to York, and of its 
revocability after he has walked half-way there." P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF 
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 441 ( 1979). 
32. I. Maurice Wormser, The True Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 
136-3 7 ( 1916). The hypothetical also inspired the following literary effort: 
"Ode to the Brooklyn Bridge" 
A bridge never meant to be crossed. 
Ifit were, then all would be lost: 
Those hypos inane, 
Law students in pain, 
And debates until Hades's first frost. 
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To Professor Wormser there was no debate: 
It is elementary that an offeror may withdraw his offer until 
it has been accepted. It follows logically that A is perfectly 
within his rights in withdrawing his offer before B has 
accepted it by walking across the bridge-the act 
contemplated by the offeror and the offeree as the 
acceptance of the offer. 33 
277 
In the article, Professor Wormser does not cite to Professor 
Langdell, who had earlier reached the same conclusion-that in 
a unilateral contract transaction, the off eror maintains the right 
to revoke his offer until the offeree completes the requested 
performance. 34 Instead, Professor Wormser cites to and 
discusses an English case, Offord v. Davies,35 as "correctly 
appl[ying] the doctrine .... "36 
Professor Wormser could have also cited to Biggers v. 
Owen, an 1888 Georgia case that supports his view. 37 Instead, 
the only American case on point that Professor Wormser cites is 
a California case, Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 38 which 
he calls the "most curious instance of reasoning on the subject 
.•.. "
39 The Los Angeles Traction Com£any ("LAT") was 
building a street railway in Los Angeles. 0 To finance the 
construction, W.B. Wilshire ("W") and others promised 
payments to LAT when the railway was completed.41 W's 
promise to pay was in the form of a $2000 promissory note held 
by a bank in escrow.42 About four months after W executed the 
Douglass G. Boshkoff, Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1533, 
1537 (1991). 
33. Wormser, supra note 32, at 137 (footnote omitted). 
34. See LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES (2d ed.), supra note 8, at 988. Professor 
Williston took the same position in a contracts treatise that Professor Wormser had edited. 
POLLOCK, AT LAW AND IN EQUITY,supra note 27, at 349. 
35. (1862) 142 Eng. Rep. 1336, 1338 (C.P.). 
36. Wormser, supra note 32, at 140. Langdell's casebook included Offord v. Davies, 
which he referred to in the summary as supporting this view. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF 
CASES (2d ed.), supra note 8, at 33. 
37. See 5 S.E. 193 (Ga. 1888). 
38. 67 P. 1086, 1088 (Cal. 1902); see Wormser, supra note 32, at 141. As Professor 
Wormser notes, both the Offord case and the Los Angeles Traction case were included in 
the contracts casebook he co-edited. Id. at 140-41 & nn.4-5. 
39. Wormser, supra note 32, at 141. 
40. Los Angeles Traction, 67 P. at 1087. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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note, LAT paid the Ci}j of Los Angeles $1505 for a franchise to 
construct the railway.4 After LAT began work on the railway, 
but before the work was completed, W notified LAT that he was 
revoking his promise to pa_x.44 After LAT completed the 
railway, it sued on the note. 5 The California Supreme Court 
looked to contract law in ruling for LAT: 
The contract at the date of its making was unilateral, a mere 
offer that if subsequently accepted and acted upon by the 
other party to it would ripen into a binding enforceable 
obligation. When the respondent purchased and paid 
upwards of $1,500 for a franchise it had acted upon the 
contract, and it would be manifestly unjust thereafter to 
permit the offer that had been made to be withdrawn. The 
promised consideration had then been partly performed, 
and the contract had taken on a bilateral character .... 46 
Professor Wormser found the California court's reasoning 
"curious" because (1) the contract cannot be bilateral: W, the 
offeror, asked for performance and not a .promise, and the offer 
can control the method of acceptance;4 and (2) no contract 
existed at the time that W revoked: LAT, the offeree, never 
agreed to build the street railway and would not have been in 
breach of some bilateral contract if it had not performed. 48 
In an earlier law review article (also not cited by Professor 
Wormser),49 Professor Clarence Ashley took the same position 
as Professor Wormser with respect to the reasoning of Los 
Angeles Traction: it "is a remarkable instance of confusion of 
thought. By what magic the offer had been turned into a 
'contract' does not appear."50 Professor Ashley did not, 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Los Angeles Traction, 67 P. at 1087. 
46. Id. at 1088. 
47. Wormser, supra note 32, at 141. 
48. Id. at 142; see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 49, at 
190 n.72 (1963) ("By saying that 'the contract had taken on a bilateral character,' the court 
must have meant only that the promisor could no longer revoke."). 
49. See Wormser, supra note 32, at 141-42. If Professor Wormser had fully 
acknowledged Professor Ashley's earlier work, the title of this article might be "Bearded 
Ladies Moving Safes." Professor Ashley's article included the hypothetical of an offeror 
who promised $25 in return for the offeree's moving a safe to an office in another building. 
Ashley, supra note 29, at 160-61. The offeror then revokes when the offeree has carried 
the safe to the door of the building. Id. 
50. Ashley, supra note 29, at 164. 
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however, take the same position as either Professor Wormser or 
the California Supreme Court with respect to the result. 51 
Professor Ashley took the position that an offeree's beginning 
performance pursuant to an offer to enter into a unilateral 
contract makes the offer irrevocable and looked to equitable 
estoppel as the doctrinal basis for the result: "An estoppel 
simply prevents him from withdrawin~ such action when it will 
work injustice to permit him to do so." 2 
Professor D.O. McGovney argued for that same result on 
different doctrinal grounds. 53 He would find that when W 
promised to pay the $2000 on completion of the railway, he 
made a "collateral offer" to keep the main offer open. 54 This 
collateral offer was also an offer to enter into a unilateral 
contract with the requested ferformance being the start of 
construction on the railway. 5 Professor Corbin then took a 
corresponding position for similar reasons in his law review 
article. 56 More importantly, Professor Williston switched from 
the same position as Wormser57 to this position when he served 
as Reporter for the Restatement of Contracts. 58 
51. See id. at 164-65. 
52. Id. at 168. 
53. See McGovney, supra note 29, at 658-60. 
54. See id. at 659. 
55. See id. 
56. Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal 
Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 191-92 (1917). 
57. Professor Wormser also eventually switched his position. See I. Maurice 
Wormser, Book Review, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 146 (1950) (reviewing EDWIN W. 
PATIERSON & GEORGE w. GOBLE, CASES ON CONTRACTS (3d ed. 1949) ("l have 
repented, so that now, clad in sackcloth, I state frankly, that my point of view has 
changed.")). 
58. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 45 cmts. a & b, at 53 (1932). 
Professor Farnsworth attributed Williston's change of position to the law review articles: 
"the debate in the law reviews convinced him that Langdell was wrong .... The battle was 
fought and won in the pages of the law reviews .... " E. Allan Farnsworth, Casebooks and 
Scholarship: Confessions of An American Opinion Clipper, 42 SW. L.J. 903, 913 (1988) 
[hereinafter Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarship]. Professor Farnsworth's article was 
based on a lecture delivered at the Southern Methodist University School of Law (now 
known as the Dedman School of Law of Southern Methodist University). Id. at 903. 
Understandably, the law review editors did not require Professor Farnsworth to provide a 
footnote explaining the basis for the statement. See id. at 913; cf Kevin M. Teeven, 
Origins of Promissory Estoppe/: Justifiable Reliance and Commercial Uncertainty Before 
Williston 's Restatement, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 499, 563 (2004) (stating that the reason for 
Williston's shift in position was "obviously influenced by McGovney's suggestions in 
1914"). 
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C. Williston's Restatement of Original Contracts 
Professor Williston was the Reporter for the Restatement of 
Contracts ("Restatement"). 59 In most respects, the Restatement 
was Williston' s Restatement. 60 
1. Talking Langdell's Talk 
The Restatement used Langdell' s terms "unilateral 
contract" and "bilateral contract," but not his definitions. 61 
Section 12 defines the term "unilateral contract" as a contract 
"in which no J?romisor receives a promise as consideration for 
his promise." There are no illustrations after section 12.63 
There are, however, illustrations after sections 20 and 31 that 
suggest that whether a contract is unilateral or not depends on 
whether the response to an offer is performance or a promise. 64 
Applying the Restatement definition of "unilateral 
contract" in section 12 to our two hypotheticals at the beginning 
of the article, A painting O's fence in #1 or #2 would result in a 
unilateral contract, and A would have a contract law right to 
59. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS. Note the unmarked 
introductory page entitled "The American Law Institute's Committee on Contracts." 
Although this Restatement was the first of two restatements of contracts and was the very 
first of all of the American Law Institute's restatements to be finished, it is not generally 
referred to as "Restatement First of Contracts." See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Ingredients 
in the Redaction of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 81 COL UM. L. REV. l ( 1981) 
[hereinafter Farnsworth, Ingredients]. 
60. See Farnsworth, Ingredients, supra note 59, at l ("The first Restatement of 
Contracts has been characterized by Professor Herbert Wechsler of Columbia, Director of 
the American Law Institute, as 'a legendary success.' He attributed this in good part to 
Professor Samuel Williston .... "); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 
59 (1974) ("Williston and Corbin were unquestionably the dominant intellectual influences 
in the drafting of the Restatement of Contracts .... [T]he Restatement of Contracts is not 
only the best of the Restatements, it is one of the great legal accomplishments of all 
time."); Teeven, supra note 58, at 510-11; see generally Arthur L. Corbin, Samuel 
Williston, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1327 (1963). 
61. See LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES (2d ed.), supra note 8, at 2. 
62. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 12, at 10. In the draft dated 
February 15, 1924, the definition of unilateral contract was in section 10: a contract "in 
which the promise or promises are made by one person only or several persons acting as a 
unit." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 10, at 7 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
1924). In the draft dated May 17, 1924, the definition of unilateral contract was in section 
l 0: a contract "in which no promisor is also a promisee." RESTATEMENT OF THE LA w OF 
CONTRACTS§ 10, at 10 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1924). 
63. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 12, at 10. 
64. See, e.g., id. at § 20 illus. 3, at 26; § 31 illus. 1 & 2, at 40. 
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recover the $1200 contract price.65 If, however, A started 
painting and then 0 told A to stop painting, we would have to 
apply Restatement section 45. 66 
2. Walking on Wormser's Brooklyn Bridge 
In some respects section 45 can be viewed as Professor 
McGovney's section.67 Under section 45, party A in Professor 
Wormser's Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical cannot revoke after B 
has started walking across the Brooklyn Bridge. Restatement 
section 45, "Revocation of Offer for Unilateral Contract; Effect 
of Part Performance or Tender," reads as follows: 
If an off er for a unilateral contract is made, and part of the 
consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by 
the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a 
contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is 
conditional on the full consideration being given or 
tendered within the time stated in the offer, or, if no time is 
stated therein, within a reasonable time. 68 
And the Restatement's reason for the rule reads very much like 
Professor McGovney's article. Comment b to Restatement 
section 45 provides in part: 
The main offer includes as a subsidiary promise, 
necessarily implied, that if part of the requested 
performance is given, the offeror will not revoke his offer, 
and that if tender is made it will be accepted. Part 
performance or tender may thus furnish consideration for 
subsidiary promises. 69 
65. See id. at§ 12, at 10. 
66. See id. at § 45, at 53. 
67. Professor McGovney proposed a solution of this sort as far back as 1914, in 
which part performance by the offeree precludes revocation. McGovney, supra note 29, at 
658; see also Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, 
Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I, 7 (1992)("Williston, ... with Corbin's 
assistance, essentially adapted the McGovney proposal to create what ultimately became 
section 45 of the first Restatement of Contracts."). But cf Stoljar, supra note 31, at 527 
n.53 ("The inclusion of§ 45 in the Restatement may perhaps be attributed to the influence 
of Professor Corbin who proposed a solution of this sort as far back as 1917."). 
68. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 45, at 53. 
69. See id. at § 45 cmt. b, at 53. Nothing in the ALI Proceedings is helpful in 
understanding the provenance or particulars of section 45. See 3 A.L.l. PROC. 204-05 
(1925), microformed on Am. L. Inst. Publ'n No. 3 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc.). 
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The Restatement illustrates the application of section 45 
with this hypothetical: 
A says to B, "I will not ask you to promise to instal [sic] an 
intra-mural telephone system which will work perfectly in 
my building, but if you care to try to do it, I will pay you 
$1000 if you succeed." B begins the work. When it is 
partly finished, A revokes his offer. If B can prove that he 
would have complied with the terms of the offer, he has a 
right to damages-the contract price less the cost of 
completing the installation. 70 
Note that the Restatement's "intra-mural telephone system" 
illustration involves the start of the requested performance: "B 
begins the work."71 "Part performance" satisfies the 
requirement in section 45 of "part of the consideration requested 
in the offer .... "72 
Consider a revised version of the "intra-mural telephone 
system" illustration in which Y makes the same statement to D 
that A made to B, but D, instead of beginning work as B had, 
merely buys the special materials appropriate only for an "intra-
mural telephone system" which will work perfectly in Y's 
building. D then moves the materials to Y's building, and Y 
backs out. 73 Section 45 would not apply to this hypothetical. 74 
In other words-the words of comment b to section 45-if D 
was "merely acting in justifiable reliance on an offer," then D 
could not recover under section 45, but may recover under 
promissory estoppel as outlined in section 90. 75 
Restatement section 90 requires neither "part of the 
consideration" nor "part performance."76 Instead, section 90 
reqmres "action . . . of a definite and substantial character 
"
77 That phrase in section 90 would seem to include not 
70. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 45 illus. l, at 54. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at § 45, at 54. 
73. See id. at§ 45 illus. l, at 54. 
74. See id. at § 45 cmt. b, at 53. 
75. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 45 cmt. b, at 54 ("[M]erely acting 
in justifiable reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason for making a 
promise binding ... . ");see also id. at§ 90, at 110. 
76. See id. 
77. Id. 
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only D's reliance on Y's promise, but also B's part performance 
of A's offer if B's part performance was "substantial."78 
Section 90 requires that any justifiable reliance be 
"substantial," but section 45 does not require that the part 
performance be substantial. 79 In Professor Wormser' s Brooklyn 
Bridge hypothetical, then, if B takes one step on the Brooklyn 
Bridge, A is bound under section 45. 80 In applying the 
provisions of the first Restatement then, it is necessary not only 
to distinguish between actions that constitute part performance 
and other actions of reliance, but also to distinguish between 
offers to enter into unilateral contracts and other statements. 
3. Defining Restatement Section 45's 
"Offer for a Unilateral Contract" 
Recall that section 45 begins, "If an offer for a unilateral 
contract is made .... "81 What exactly is a unilateral contract? 
How can one be offered? Can there be a reverse unilateral 
contract? Is there a presumption favoring a particular type of 
contract? This sub-section answers each question in tum. 
a. Definition of "Unilateral Contract" 
The Restatement does not define what constitutes an "offer 
for a unilateral contract. "82 It instead only defines the term 
"unilateral contract" in section 12 as "one in which no promisor 
receives a promise as consideration for his promise. "83 The 
section 12 definition of "unilateral contract" does not help 
78. See id. 
79. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 90, at 110, with 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 45, at 53. 
80. James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CAL. L. REV. 547, 605 (1995) 
(concluding that "one step across the bridge binds the promisor"). Law review articles not 
only distinguish between the level of offeree activity required by Restatement sections 45 
and 90, but also the level of offeror liability created by Restatement sections 45 and 90. 
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Revocation of Offers, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 271, 294 (2004) 
("Unlike Section 87(2) of the Second Restatement, section 45 of the First Restatement took 
the position that when the implied promise to keep an offer for a unilateral contract open is 
enforceable, the remedy is expectation damages."). Professor Eisenberg (or an editor of 
the Wisconsin Law Review) cites Restatement section 45 to support that proposition 
directly. Id. at 294 & n.66. 
81. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 45, at 53. 
82. Id. 
83. See id. at§ 12, at 10. 
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define the phrase "offer for a unilateral contract." The 
Restatement defined the wrong term. We don't need a 
definition of "unilateral contract." If, by definition, a contract 
exists, we have defined away the problems. If a contract does 
exist, the legal consequences are the same regardless of whether 
the contract is "unilateral" or "bilateral. "84 
Problems arise in applying the Restatement sections on 
formation of a unilateral contract when it is argued that there is 
an offer but not a contract. 85 More specifically, problems arise 
when it is argued that there is not a contract because the offer 
was an offer for a unilateral contract, and that offer has not been 
accepted because the off eree' s performance has not yet been 
completed. 86 To apply these sections of the Restatement, we 
need a definition of "offer for a unilateral contract," not a 
definition of "unilateral contract." 
b. Definition of "Offer for a Unilateral Contract" 
Neither section 12 nor section 45 nor any other 
Restatement provision defines the term "offer for a unilateral 
contract."87 Section 45 does, however, provide the "illustration" 
considered earlier. 88 Recall what A says to B in that illustration: 
"I will not ask you to promise to instal [sic] an intra-mural 
telephone system which will work perfectly in my building, but 
if you care to try to do it, I will pay you $1000 if you 
succeed."89 If this example is what an "offer for a unilateral 
contract" looks like, then only hypothetical #2 ("only by 
painting the house and not by promising to paint the house") 
looks like an "offer for a unilateral contract." 
84. Stoljar, supra note 31, at 516-18 (stating that the unilateral-bilateral distinction 
"has no practical relevance for what is perhaps the vast majority of cases"). 
85. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 31 & cmt. a, at 39; § 45 & 
cmt. c, at 54. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at§ 12, at 10; § 45, at 53. 
88. See id. at § 45 illus. 1, at 54; supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
89. RESTATEMENTOFTHELAWOFCONTRACTS § 45 illus. l, at 54. 
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c. Reverse Unilateral Contracts 
There is also an example of what is called a "reverse 
unilateral contract"90 in section 57, which is entitled "Unilateral 
Contract Where Proposed Act is to be Done by Offeror."91 It 
provides that if "in an off er of a unilateral contract the proposed 
act or forbearance is that of the offeror, the contract is not 
complete until the offeree makes the promise requested."92 
Section 57 also provides the following illustration: "A writes to 
B, who is boarding A's horse, 'I should like to sell my horse to 
you, and if you will promise to pay $200 for it, the horse is 
yours.' B makes the requested promise. Ownership of the horse 
is thereupon instantly transferred to him."93 Neither section 57 
nor its illustration is helpful in understanding what an offer to 
enter into a unilateral contract is. In the illustration, once B 
makes the requested promise, there is obviously a contract. 94 
It is not obvious why A's offer is, in the language of 
section 57, "an offer of a unilateral contract."95 Look again at 
the language of Restatement section 57: what is the "proposed 
act or forbearance ... of the offeror"?96 Is it the fact that B is 
boarding A's horse? Would there not be a "bilateral contract," 
as that term is defined in the Restatement, if A had possession of 
the horse and said, "If you will promise to pay $200 
immediately, I promise to sell you my horse immediately," and 
B had made the requested promise? Why then is A's offer not 
in the illustration to section 57, an offer that "invites the 
formation of a bilateral contract," particularly in light of the 
presumption in section 31 ?97 
90. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS§ 2.10, at 67 
(5th ed. 2003) ("In the usual unilateral contract, the promise is made by the offeror. 
However, in the unusual case of a reverse unilateral contract the offeree makes the only 
promise .... The most common reverse unilateral contracts arise where the offeree silently 
accepts services that are rendered with the expectation of payment."). 
91. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 57, at 64. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at § 57 illus. 1, at 65. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. at§ 57, at 64. 
96. RESTATEMENTOFTHELAWOFCONTRACTS § 57, at 64. 
97. See id. at§ 31, at 39. 
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d. Presumption of Offer to Enter into Bilateral Contract 
The Restatement presumes that offers invite a bilateral 
contract. 98 Section 31 provides the following: 
In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer invites the 
formation of a bilateral contract by an acceptance 
amounting in effect to a promise by the offeree to perform 
what the offer requests, rather than the formation of one or 
more unilateral contracts by actual performance on the part 
of the offeree. 99 
The two illustrations of offers in section 31 look very much 
like the first hypothetical in this article. 100 In both of the 
Restatement illustrations the offeree responds to the offer with a 
promise, and a bilateral contract results. If this means that these 
offers were only "offers that invite a bilateral contract" and not 
also "offer[ s] for unilateral contract," then again, only our 
second hypothetical-"this offer can only be accepted by 
painting the fence"-looks like an offer for a unilateral 




100. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 31 illus. l & 2, at 40, 
with supra note 1 and accompanying text. Restatement section 31, illustration 1: "A says 
to B: 'If you will work in my garden next week I will give you $5 a day.' B says, 'I'll do 
it.' There is a bilateral contract." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 31 illus. 
1, at 40. Illustration 2: "A says to B: 'If you will let me have that table that you are 
making, when it is finished, I will give you $100 for it.' B replies, 'All right.' There is a 
bilateral contract." Id. at§ 31 illus. 2, at 40. Similarly, in hypothetical #1, if A says "all 
right," there is a bilateral contract. 
IOI. But cf PERILLO, supra note 90, at 66 ("If A says to B, 'If you run in the New 
York Marathon and finish I will pay you $1,000' .... A has thus made an offer looking to 
a unilateral contract.''). 
102. K.N. Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance I, 48 
YALE L.J. 1, 36 (1938) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance I]. 
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D. Karl Nickerson Llewellyn's Bearded Ladies 
Karl Llewellyn 103 taught contracts at the University of 
Chicago, Columbia, and Yale. 104 He is best known for his work 
on the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), which somehow 
works as the general law for contracts involving sales of goods 
without using the phrases "bilateral contract," "unilateral 
contract," "offer to enter into bilateral contract," or "offer to 
enter into unilateral contract." Section 2-206(1) of the UCC 
simply provides: "[ u ]nless otherwise unambiguously indicated 
by the language or circumstances ... an order or other offer to 
buy goods for prompt or current shipment shall be construed as 
inviting acceptance either by a prom~t promise to ship or by the 
prompt or current shipment . . . . " 1 5 After Williston and his 
advisers finished their work on the Restatement, and before Karl 
Llewellyn and his advisers began their work on the Uniform 
Revised Sales Act and then the UCC, Llewellyn wrote a series 
of articles critical of the Restatement's "Great Dichotomy" 
103. For more on Karl Llewellyn, see Brian Leiter, Llewellyn Karl Nickerson (1893-
1962), in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, 
8999-9001 (Karl Ulrich Meyer ed., 2001), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/ 
bleiter/LllewellynEncyclopedia.pdf (last visited May 24, 2006); see also Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Strangers to Us All, Lawyers and Poetry, http://www.wvu.edu/-lawfac/jelkins/ 
lp-2001/llewellyn.htrnl (last visited May 24, 2006). For more than you want to know 
(unless you watch Desperate Housewives and bought a Sirius Satellite Radio to listen to 
Howard Stem) about the late Professor Llewellyn, see James J. Connolly et al., Alcoholism 
and Angst in the Life and Work of Karl Llewellyn, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 43, 44-45 (1998) 
("Llewellyn became an emotionally volatile alcoholic, plagued by severe feelings of sexual 
and professional failure.") (footnotes omitted). 
104. See Leiter, supra note 103, at 8999. 
105. U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (14th ed. 1995). Professor Williston was critical of this 
change: 
Section 2-206 again seeks to vary the law of contracts .... The question is a 
general one of the law of contracts, and it is unfortunate to have a special rule 
on the point for sales of goods. And in this case the provision would be 
objectionable if made for all contracts. The Restatement of Contracts states 
that in case of doubt an offer is presumed to be for a bilateral contract, and 
also that if an offer is for a bilateral contract, performance without a promise 
creates a contract if performance is rendered within the time allowable for a 
promise by the terms of the offer. This states existing law and extends as far 
as the law should go. If a buyer makes an offer asking for actual 
performance, then not promises but performance should be held a condition 
of his offer. 
Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. 
L. REV. 561, 577 (1950) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of the relationship of 
Section 2-206, the Restatement, and the Restatement Second, see John E. Murray, Jr., The 
Revision of Article 2: Romancing the Prism, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1447 (1994). 
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between unilateral and bilateral contracts. 106 In one of the 
articles, Llewellyn more accurately describes the "Great 
Dichotomy" as a "Theoretical or Classroom Dichotomy": 
the question recurs in the classrooms of the country: "Did 
he ask for a promise or for an act-for an act or for a 
promise?"-with the eternal suggestion that only one is 
normally asked for, and that only the one will do. This 
makes, as we all know, for superb classroom theatrics; I 
know of none which have ever given me personally equal 
fun. But the fun comes at a high cost to students' real 
understanding. 107 
However described by Llewellyn, we think the dichotomy 
discussed in his law review articles can best be described as the 
Restatement's dichotomy between offers to enter into unilateral 
contracts and offers to enter into bilateral contracts, not a 
dichotomy between unilateral contracts and bilateral contracts. 
From the title to the first sentence to the balance of the articles, 
Llewellyn's focus is on offer and acceptance-more 
specifically, on "certain rules about Offer and Acceptance in the 
initiation of business bargains, and [on] certain 'orthodox' rules 
as being either defective or false or unwise .... " 108 Llewellyn 
would see the offer in our introductory hypothetical #1 as an 
offer that could be accepted by A's promise, A's complete 
performance, or A's starting to perform, and the off er in our 
hypothetical #2 as an off er that is not seen in actual business 
deals. 109 Again, we see Llewellyn's focus on offers and the 
Restatement's flawed classification of offers. 
Ill. RESTATEMENT SECOND AND BEARDED LADIES 
AND WALKING ON THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE 
Contract scholars working on the Restatement Second, 
however, saw Llewellyn's articles as "concern" about the 
Restatement classification of contracts into unilateral and 
106. See, e.g., K.N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance II, 
48 YALE L.J. 779, 787 (1939) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance 11]; see also 
generally Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance I, supra note 102; K.N. Llewellyn, The Rule of 
Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938). 
107. Llewellyn, Offer and Acceptance II, supra note 106, at 787. 
108. Id. at 780. 
109. See id. at 813. 
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bilateral. As then-Professor Braucher, first Reporter for the 
Restatement Second, wrote: "In a preliminary draft . . . the 
reporter sought to introduce similar concern by way of comment 
to the definitions of unilateral and bilateral contracts in Section 
12."110 
A. Restatement Second and Bearded Ladies 
There are no "bearded ladies" in the Restatement Second. 
At least, no one called a "bearded lady." 
1. Elimination of Definitions 
A Reporter's note to the first draft of the Restatement 
Second provided: 
Section 12 of the original Restatement defined unilateral 
and bilateral contracts. It is deleted because of doubt as to 
the utility of the distinction, often treated as fundamental, 
between the two types .... 
The principal value of the distinction has been the emphasis 
it has given to the fact that a promise is often binding on the 
promisor even though the promisee is not bound by any 
promise. 111 ' · 
The Restatement Second deleted not only the Restatement 
section 12 definitions of "bilateral contract" and "unilateral 
contract," but also all references to "bilateral contract" or 
"unilateral contract," which now appear only in comments. 112 
For example, Restatement Second section 55 replaces 
Restatement section 57. 113 Both contemplate a contract based 
on a performance treated as an offer followed by a promise, 
which is treated as an acceptance. Restatement section 57 uses 
the term "unilateral contract" in its title and its text. 114 
Restatement Second section 55 mentions "unilateral contract" 
only in the title and text to Comment a. 115 It is as if under the 
110. Braucher, supra note 3, at 304; see also Tiersma, supra note 67, at 8-10. 
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12, Reporter's Note, at 17 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 1964) (1973). 
112. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 cmt. a, at 118; § 55 
cmt. a, at 140 (1979). 
113. Id. at§ 55, Reporter's Note, at 141. 
114. See RESTATEMENTOFTHELAWOF CONTRACTS§ 57, at 64 (1932). 
115. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 55 cmt. a, at 140: 
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Restatement Second it is politically incorrect to refer to 
"bearded ladies." Perhaps the phrase "facially hirsute women" 
is more "acceptable." 11 And, it would seem that any such 
reference is unnecessary because of Restatement Second 
sections 32 and 62, discussed below. 
2. Change of Presumption 
It would also seem as if any such reference to "unilateral 
contracts" is unnecessary. Section 31 of the Restatement created 
a presumption of an offer to enter into a bilateral contract, i.e., 
an offer accepted by a promise. 117 By contrast, section 32 of the 
Restatement Second creates a presumption of indifference: An 
offer can be accef:ted by promise or performance, whichever the 
offeree chooses. 1 8 As Professor Robert Braucher119 points out: 
"This concept of an offer to enter into a contract which may be 
either unilateral or bilateral did not appear in the original 
Restatement." 120 
Id. 
"Reverse unilateral contracts." It is possible to offer a performance without 
making any promise. Like other offers, a non-promissory offer may require 
acceptance by performance or acceptance by promise or a combination of the 
two, or it may leave the mode of acceptance to the offeree's choice. An 
exchange of performances is not within the definition of"contract" ... and is 
beyond the scope of the Restatement of this Subject. But where a non-
promissory offer is accepted by promise, there is a contract if the 
requirements other than manifestation of mutual assent are met. Since the 
contract formed by a performance in response to an offer of a promise such 
as an offer of reward is often called a "unilateral contract," the type of 
contract referred to in this Section is sometimes referred to as a "reverse 
unilateral contract." Contracts so referred to often involve incidental 
promises by the performing offeror, and in that event the word "unilateral" is 
not entirely appropriate. 
116. Unless you are doing a Google search and are offended by porn .... 
117. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 31, at 39. 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 32, at 89. 
119. In praising the work of Professor Farnsworth as the second Reporter for the 
Restatement Second, Professor Jean Braucher suggests that the work on the provisions of 
the Restatement Second relevant to the unilateral contract issues discussed in this article 
had been largely completed while Professor Robert Braucher was Reporter. Jean Braucher, 
In Memoriam: E. Allan Farnsworth and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1420 (2005). 
120. Braucher, supra note 3, at 307. 
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B. Restatement Second and Labeling People 
Walking on the Brooklyn Bridge 
At first blush then, the Restatement Second seems to 
eliminate the need to identify "bearded ladies." Blush again. 
While Restatement Second eliminates the Restatement section 
12 definitions, and Restatement Second section 32 eliminates 
the Restatement's bilateral presumption, Restatement Second 
sections 45 and 62 make it even more important to label 
properlythe people walking on the Brooklyn Bridge. 121 
1. ·Restatement Second Section 45 
Like Restatement section 45, Restatement Second section 
45 provides that the offeror cannot revoke its offer to pay $100 
for walking across the Brooklyn Bridge if: (1) the offeree has 
now started walking across the Brooklyn Bridge, and (2) the 
offer is the type of offer that triggers section 45. 122 And, like 
Restatement section 45, Restatement Second section 45 makes 
no provision as to whether the offeree has incurred any legal 
obligation to complete walking across the bridge. 123 
The major difference between Restatement section 45 and 
Restatement Second section 45 is the language as to when the 
section applies. 124 Compare the limiting language of 
Restatement section 45-"If an offer for a unilateral contract is 
made" 125-with the limiting language of Restatement Second 
section 45-"Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by 
rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory 
acceptance .... " 126 
The language in Restatement section 45 needs to be read 
together with Restatement section 31, which, in essence, creates 
a presumption against the application of Restatement section 
45. 127 And, the language in Restatement Second section 45 
121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 45, at 118; § 62, at 149. 
122. Id. at § 45, at 118. 
123. Id. 
124. But cf Tiersma, supra note 67, at 7 ("The solution adopted in Restatement 
section 45 formed the basis for the similar language in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts."). 
125. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 45, at 53. 
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 45, at 118. 
127. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 31, at 39. 
292 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:267 
needs to be read together with Restatement Second section 32, 
which, in essence, creates a presum~tion against the application 
of Restatement Second section 45. 1 8 The presumption against 
applying Restatement Second section 45 is clearer if not 
stronger than the presumption against applying Restatement 
section 45. 129 
If we apply the language of Restatement sections 45 and 31 
to introductory hypotheticals #1 and #2, we conclude that the 
start of performance by A in #2 . (but not # 1) triggers 
Restatement section 45-"the offeror 0 is bound." A, in 
introductory hypothetical #2, however, is not legally obligated to 
finish performance. Similarly, applying the different language 
of Restatement Second sections 45 and 32 to introductory 
hypotheticals #1 and #2, we conclude that the start of 
performance under #2 (but not # 1) triggers Restatement Second 
section 45-"creates an option contract," i.e., "the offeror 0 is 
bound." And again, A, in introductory hypothetical #2, is not 
legally obligated to finish. To finish the application of 
Restatement Second to our two introductory hypotheticals, we 
need to look again at introductory hypothetical #1 and 
Restatement Second section 62. 130 There is not a Restatement 
counterpart to Restatement Second section 62. 
2. Restatement Second Section 62 
Section 62 of Restatement Second, "Effect of Performance 
by Offeree Where Offer Invites Either Performance or 
Promise," 131 provides: 
128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 32, at 89. 
129. See id.§ l cmt. f, at 7; RESTATEMENTOFTHELAWOFCONTRACTS § 45 cmt. a., 
at 118; see also Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 558 
(1983) ("[T]he drafters intended that Section 45 apply only to a small minority of cases; 
they believed that only rarely do offerors intend to limit the mode of acceptance to 
performance."); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 32 cmt. b, at 90. But cf 
Farnsworth, Ingredients, supra note 59, at 5 ("Sometimes innovation does not take the 
form of a new substantive rule but rather of a new perspective on the problem, reflected in 
the substitution of a new terminology or analysis for a traditional one. For example, the 
Restatement (Second) abandons the terms 'unilateral' and 'bilateral' as descriptive of 
contracts .... "). 
130. But cf CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., RULES OF CONTRACT LAW (Supp. 2005-
2006). This student supplement with "selections" from the Restatement Second did not 
"select" section 62. 
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 62, at 149. 
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(1) Where an offer invites an offeree to choose between 
acceptance by promise and acceptance by performance, the 
tender or beginning of the invited performance or a tender 
of a beginning of it is an acceptance by performance. 
(2) Such an acceptance operates as a promise to render 
complete performance. 132 
Section 62 of Restatement Second leads to a new and different 
result in introductory hypothetical # 1. Restatement Second 
section 62 applies when "an offer invites an offeree to choose 
between acceptance by promise and acceptance by performance 
.... "
133 Like Restatement Second section 45, section 62 
focuses on the offer-it is what the offer says that determines 
whether section 45 or section 62 applies. Under the clear 
presumption of Restatement Second section 32, Restatement 
Second section 62 applies to our introductory hypothetical #1. 
And, when Restatement Second section 62 applies, the 
beginning of performance-A's starting to paint 0 's house-is 
"acceptance." In other words, in hypothetical #1, governed by 
Restatement Second section 62, A's starting to paint imposes 
contract obligations on both 0 and A, while in hypothetical #2, 
governed by Restatement Second section 45, A's starting to 
paint only obligates 0. 
Again, it is O's offer that determines whether Restatement 
Second section 45 applies so that only the offeror is obligated, or 
Restatement Second section 62 applies so that both the offeree 
and the offeror are obligated. Common sense suggests that in 
cases like our house painting hypotheticals, the off eror would 
almost always frame her offer so as to trigger Restatement 
Second section 62, so that once A starts painting her house, A is 
obligated to finish painting. 
Common sense also suggests that only in a reward or prize 
situation like Wormser's Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical 134 would 
an offeror not intend that if he is obligated, the offeree should 
also be obligated. In other words, all the "bearded ladies" or 
"facially hirsute women" are walking on the Brooklyn Bridge; 
none of them are painting houses or doing other commercial 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
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things. 135 The comments to Restatement Second can be read as 
supporting that common sense suggestion. 136 But that is not 
what law students are reading in the twenty-first century 
counterparts to Langdell's Summary, or what lawyers are 
reading in reported cases. 
IV. MATERIALS FOR LAW STUDENTS 
Recall that Langdell first contrasted bilateral and unilateral 
contracts in a summary he wrote for law student use. 137 
Accordingly, let's look at the treatment of bilateral and 
unilateral contracts in the "summaries" law students use 
today. 138 
The summary most used by law students is The Conviser 
Mini Review. 139 It has a section entitled "Unilateral or Bilateral 
135. Cf E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.24, at 183 (4th ed. 2004) ("The 
popularity of the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical has been due in part to the lack of more 
practical illustrations."); see also generally Mark B. Wessman, Is "Contract" the Name of 
the Game? Promotional Games as Test Cases for Contract Theory, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 635, 
636 (1992) (discussing promotional games as a more practical illustration). 
136. We agree with Professor Pettit who relied on (1) Comment f to Restatement 
Second section 1, Reporter's Note, (2) Comment b to Restatement Second section 32, and 
(3) Comment a to Restatement Second section 45 to conclude that "the drafters intended 
that Section 45 apply only to a small minority of [non-commercial] cases; they believed 
that only rarely do offerors intend to limit the mode of acceptance to performance." Pettit, 
supra note 129, at 557-58 & n.36. 
137. See generally LANGDELL, SUMMARY, supra note 8; see also supra text 
accompanying note 10. 
138. We know that Langdell's summary was physically a part of a casebook. See 
LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES (2d ed.), supra note 8 and accompanying text. And, 
we know that Professor Farnsworth wrote two articles about contracts casebooks as 
"scholarship." See Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarship, supra note 58, at 903; E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 
1406 (1987). We do not know whether casebooks are "scholarship," at least as that word is 
used at "top tier" law schools like Georgetown. We do know that while the summaries 
discussed in this article are not "scholarship," however that word is used, students at all 
tiers of law school read these summaries more than they read casebooks. 
To the extent that students still read casebooks, they are reading much less about 
"unilateral contracts" and "bilateral contracts." Compare LON L. FULLER & ROBERT 
BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 308-50 (1964) (including a forty-two page section on 
unilateral contracts), with LON L. FuLLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT 
LAW 434-36 (7th ed. 2001) (containing only a "note" slightly longer than one page on 
offers to enter into unilateral contracts, although there are also five other page entries under 
"unilateral contract" in the index). 
139. A recent antitrust suit alleges that more than 95% of the students who take the 
bar and take a bar review course take the course with Barbri. Complaint at 12, Rodriguez 
v. West Publ'g Corp., No. CV05 3222 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2005), available at 
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Contract," which states "[m]odem courts generally interpret an 
offer as unilateral only if its terms clearly warn that an act is 
required for acceptance." 140 The Conviser Mini Review also 
reviews the rule of Restatement section 45 without mentioning 
the Brooklyn Bridge, Restatement section 45 or Restatement 
Second section 45: "The offeror' s power to revoke is limited if 
. . . [i]n the case of a unilateral contract, the offeree has 
embarked on performance .... " 141 
A popular summary other than Conviser is Gilbert Law 
Summaries. 142 And Gilbert's 143 uses both the term "unilateral 
contract" 144 and the Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical. 145 Professor 
Robert Hillman's popular new "concise hombook" on contracts 
uses a piano problem instead of a Brooklyn Bridge 
hypothetical 146 and defiantly uses the terms "unilateral contract" 
and "bilateral contract": "Despite the Restatement drafters' 
conclusion that the terminology 'unilateral and bilateral' 
contract was obsolete, the terms are still helpful in encapsulating 
the concepts and you should not hesitate to use them. (If 
anybody criticizes you, please tell them to call me)." 147 
Professor Hillman discloses neither his phone number nor what 
http://www.lawschool.com/BarBriComplaint.pdf; see also Jeremy Blachman, Good Luck 
With That . .. , THE REC., Feb. 3, 2005, available at http://www.hlrecord.org/media/paper 
609/news/2005/02/03/0pinion/ good-Luck.With. That-851848.shtml?norewrite&sourcedom 
ain=www.hlrecord.org ("There's a book called the 'Conviser Mini Review.' I assume 
Conviser is a Latin word meaning 'horribly unpleasant to read."'). 
140. THE CONVISER MINI REVIEW: CONTRACTS 10 (2005). "Clearly wam"-
interesting choice of words. I don't know what "warn" means in this context. You need to 
know that although I do bar review lectures for the company that Conviser runs, BAR/BRI, 
I did not write any part of the Mini Review. 
141. Id. at 5-6. "Embarked on performance." Again, an "interesting" choice of 
words-again, not our words. 
142. We had thought we would be the first law review authors to cite to a Gilbert 
Law Summary. We are not even the first law review authors to cite to the Gilbert Contract 
Law Summary. See Douglas L. Leslie, How Not to Teach Contracts, and Any Other 
Course Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casejile Method, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1289, 1290 n.2 
(2000). 
143. Just as "Conviser" did not write the "Conviser" Mini Review, "Gilbert" did not 
write "Gilbert" Law Summaries. Professor Melvin A. Eisenberg, one of our heroes, wrote 
Gilbert Law Summaries on Contracts. We are reasonably certain that Professor Eisenberg 
did not write the Conviser Mini Review. 
144. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, GILBERT LAW SUMMARIES ON CONTRACTS § 33 
(2002). 
145. Id. at§ 245. 
146. See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 55 (2004). 
147. Id. at 47-48 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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he means by "the concepts" that are· encapsulated in the 
terms. 148 
V. POST-RESTATEMENT SECOND REPORTED CASES 
USING THE TERMS UNILATERAL CONTRACT AND 
BILATERAL CONTRACT 
Like Professor Hillman, courts continue to use the terms 
"unilateral contract" and "bilateral contract" without directly 
indicating what the terms are "encapsulating."149 More than 
twenty years ago, Professor Mark Pettit, Jr. reported: 
An examination of American cases, decided since the first 
tentative draft of the Second Restatement was published in 
1964, reveals not only that lawyers and judges continue to 
employ unilateral contract analysis in traditional areas, but 
that they find the concept useful for expanding contractual 
analysis into new areas. Of particular importance is the use 
of unilateral contract to establish one-way obligations of 
such institutions as employers, governments, and schools 
toward individuals with whom they deal. Unilateral 
contract has become an important concept in defining 
relationships that arise in our increasingly organized 
society. 150 
A review of American cases shows 435 reported cases since 
January 1, 2000, that have used the phrase. 151 While "unilateral 
contract analysis" is clearly being used, less clear is whether 
courts are using it, or should be using it, to expand such 
contractual analysis into new areas. Two examples of the areas 
that Professor Pettit mentions are particularly worth discussing: 
government contracts and employment contracts. 
148. See id. It is (607) 255-4902; see also Cornell Law School Faculty, Robert A. 
Hillman, http://www.lawschool.comell.edu/faculty/faculty _ bios/hillman.html (last visited 
May 24, 2006). 
149. See, e.g., D.L. Peoples Group, Inc. v. Hawley, 804 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002); Papas v. Michigan Gaming Control Bd., 669 N.W.2d 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2003). 
150. Pettit, supra note 129, at 551-52 (footnote omitted). 
151. Based on a Westlaw search conducted in December 2005 in the "all cases" 
database for "unilateral contract." 
2006] UN/LATERAL CONTRACT FORMATION 297 
A. Government Contracts: Contract Zoning 
In law school, zoning is taught in property law classes and 
is also taught in constitutional law classes because it is part of 
the police power. 152 Zoning in the United States dates from the 
1916 New York City comprehensive zoning ordinance 153 and 
the 1926 decision in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co. 154 A 
recent law review article describes the zoning process as 
follows: "The traditional zoning process consists of the 
adoption of a comprehensive plan and the issuance of local 
zoning ordinances pursuant to the plan. The adoption of local 
zoning ordinances is accomplished by a hearing and public 
participation." 155 
"Contract zoning" is based on bargaining between a 
governmental entity and a land owner. The use of the phrase 
"contract zoning" in reported cases dates from dicta in the 1960 
New York Court of Appeals decision in Church v. Town of 
1 l . 156 s lp. 
Appellants' arguments all revolve about the idea that this is 
illegal as "contract zoning" because the Town Board, as a 
condition for rezoning, required the owners to execute and 
record restrictive covenants as to maximum area to be 
occupied by buildings and as to a fence and shrubbery. 
Surely these conditions were intended to be and are for the 
benefit of the neighbors. Since the Town Board could 
have, presumably, zoned this Bay Shore Road comer for 
business without any restrictions, we fail to see how 
reasonable conditions invalidate the legislation. Since the 
owners have accepted them, there is no one in a position to 
contest them. Exactly what "contract zoning" means is 
152. See JOHN E. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 321 (1962) ("So 
extensive a regulation can be justified only under the police power of the state."). 
153. Cf JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 592 (2000) ("In 
1920, only New York and a few other cities had comprehensive zoning."). 
154. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding the constitutionality of the Euclid zoning 
ordinance under the city's police power). 
155. Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-for Zoning That Is 
Neither Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 386 (2004) 
(footnotes omitted). 
156. 168 N.E.2d 680 (N.Y. 1960). There were earlier decisions that invalidated what 
today would be called "contract zoning" without calling it "contract zoning." See, e.g., 
Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); V.F. Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning 
Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131-32 (N.J. 1952). 
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unclear and there is really no New York law on the subject. 
All legislation "by contract" is invalid in the sense that a 
Legislature cannot bargain away or sell its powers. But we 
deal here with actualities, not phrases. To meet increasing 
needs of Suffolk County's own population explosion, and 
at the same time to make as gradual and as little of an 
annoyance as possible the change from residence to 
business on the main highways, the Town Board imposes 
conditions. There is nothing unconstitutional about it. 
Incidentally, the record does not show any agreement in the 
sense that the owners made an offer accepted by the 
board. 157 
Exactly what "contract zoning" means is still unclear. 158 
The arguments, however, that "contract zoning" is "illegal" are 
now more clearly stated. For example, in McLean Hospital 
Corp. v. Town of Belmont, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals 
explained: "The process is suspect because of the concern that a 
municipality will contract away its police power to regulate on 
behalf of the public in return for contractual benefits offered by 
a landowner whose interest is principally served by the zoning 
action."159 In Chung v. Sarasota County, a Florida court 
provided a different reason: 
157. Church, 168 N.E.2d at 683. 
158. See, e.g., Morgran Co. v. Orange County, 818 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2002) (defining "contract zoning" as any agreement between a governmental body 
with a landowner for zoning "for consideration"); Durand v. IDC Bellingham, LLC, 793 
N.E.2d 359, 367 n.17 (Mass. 2003) ("[W]hat one court or commentator may term 'contract 
zoning,' another might now label as something else."); Kerik v. Davidson County, 551 
S.E.2d 186, 192-93 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (limiting contract zoning to agreements based on 
reciprocal promises). 
159. 778 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002); see also generally Green, supra 
note 155, at 401-02 (discussing the "reserved powers doctrine"). But cf Lee Anne Fennell, 
Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26 
(2000). Fennell explains: 
the fact that a community is willing to sell the right to violate a given 
regulation provides a strong indication that the regulation does not constitute 
a true exercise of the police power. 
If zoning really constituted an exercise of the police power on the same order 
as a ban on shouting "fire" in a crowded theater, this objection might have 
some bite. However, zoning was designed to do something quite different-
protect property values and neighborhood environments. The planning and 
police power justifications were largely ad hoc rationalizations concocted to 
achieve this goal. ... Land use regulations are quite different from traditional 
exercises of police power .... 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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One of the reasons contract zoning is generally 
rejected is because "[t]he legislative power to enact 
and amend zoning regulations requires due process, 
notice, and hearings." "Assuming that the developer 
and municipality bargain for a rezoning ordinance that 
is fairly debatable and nondiscriminatory, contract 
zoning is nevertheless illegal when they enter into a 
bilateral agreement involving reciprocal obligations. 
By binding itself to enact the requested ordinance (or 
not to amend the existing ordinance), the municipality 
bypasses the hearing phase of the legislative 
process." 160 
299 
Note that the Florida court uses the limiting term "bilateral 
agreement." Some courts have distinguished between contract 
zoning and "unilateral contract zoning." Consider the following 
much-cited dictum from Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, a case 
holding that contract zoning was unenforceable: 
A contract to zone may be in the form of either a unilateral 
contract or a bilateral contract. . . . [I]n the context of 
contract zoning, a unilateral contract describes two possible 
situations: Either a municipality promises to rezone in 
return for some action or forbearance by the other 
contracting party, or the other contracting party makes a 
promise in return for the municipality's act of rezoning .... 
[W]e believe that contract zoning is illegal whenever it 
arises from a promise by a municipality to zone property in 
a certain manner, i.e., when a municipality is either a party 
to a bilateral contract to zone or when a municipality is a 
party to a unilateral contract in which the municipality 
promises to rezone in return for some action or forbearance 
by the other contracting party. 
A contract in which a municipality promises to zone 
property in a specified manner is illegal because, in making 
such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the 
zoning authority to zone the property according to 
prescribed legislative procedures .... 
160. 686 So. 2d 1358, 1359-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Terry E. Lewis et 
al., Spot Zoning, Contract Zoning, and Conditional Zoning, in 2 FLORIDA 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND USE LAW 9-1, 9-13 (James J. Brown ed., 2d ed. 1994); Roy 
P. Cookston & Burt Bruton, Zoning Law, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 581, 589 n.34 (1981)) 
(citations omitted). 
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The foregoing analysis implies that one form of contract 
zoning is legal: a unilateral contract in which a party 
makes a promise in return for a municipality's act of 
rezoning. In this situation, the municipality makes no 
promise and there is no enforceable contract until the 
municipality acts to rezone the property. Because the 
municipality does not commit itself to any specified action 
before the zoning hearing, it does not circumvent statutof( 
procedures or compromise the rights of affected persons. 16 
The Dacy case involved an exchange of property between 
the Village and Dacy in which Dacy transferred property to the 
Village that the Village needed for a highway right-of-way and 
the Village transferred property to Dacy that the Village 
promised to rezone from R-1 (residential single family) to R-2 
(residential multi-family). 162 After the exchange of deeds3 Dacy applied to the Village for the change in zoning to R-2. 16 The 
Planning and Zoning Commission, which advised the Village 
Council on zoning, recommended the rezoning. 164 The Village 
Council, however, denied the Dacy rezoning request. 165 Dacy 
sued, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and 
misrepresentation. 166 The trial court ruled for the Village, and 
the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed. 167 The New Mexico 
Supreme Court used the phrase "a form of unilateral contract 
zoning" and held the unilateral contract zoning unenforceable 
"because the Village attempted to commit itself to specific 
zoning action without following the required statutory 
procedures." 168 In Dacy, then, the contract zoning was not valid 
or invalid because of unilateral contract principles. The zoning 
was invalid because "required statutory procedures" were not 
followed. 
"Contract zoning" raises difficult questions about balancing 
public and private interests, about the relative roles of regulation 
and negotiation in land use regulation, and about retaining the 
161. 845 P.2d 793, 796-98 (N.M. 1992) (citations omitted). 
162. Id. at 794-95. 
163. Id. at 795. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Dacy, 845 P.2d at 795. 
167. Id. at 794. 
168. Id. at 798. 
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clarity and transparency benefits of the legislative process with 
the flexibility of the bargain. It is not helpful in working 
through these questions to either use the term "unilateral 
contract" or distinguish between "unilateral contracts" in which 
the government is the offeror from "unilateral contracts" in 
which the government is the offeree. 169 Land use scholars 
169. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive 
Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 21 n.81 (2005) ("[T]he 
unilateral-bilateral distinction is illusory; in either circumstance, an applicant will only 
accept additional property restrictions if the local government provides some 
countervailing benefit."); cf. Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: 
Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of 
Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957, 979 (1987). Wegner explains: 
Care must be taken in evaluating this body of precedent to determine whether 
the terminology adopted was intended to characterize the land use control 
mechanisms in question for purposes of defining the applicable theoretical 
framework, or whether instead, it was adopted for purposes of describing the 
ultimate disposition of the case. An examination of the cases supports the 
latter view. 
Id. But see Rando v. Town ofN. Attleborough, 692 N.E.2d 544, 549 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1998) ("We also think the contract analysis used by the court in Dacy v. Ruidoso, although 
not decisive, is persuasive .... ")(citation omitted). 
Similarly, the use of the term "unilateral contract analysis" is not helpful in 
determining whether a court should enforce a plea bargain agreement between the 
government and an individual. Courts have viewed a plea bargain as a unilateral contract 
in order to avoid two concerns: (1) "binding a defendant to a 'promise' to plead guilty 
might infringe that defendant's Fifth Amendment constitutional rights," and (2) "creat[ing] 
'practical difficulties' when ensuring compliance with [Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure] 11 's knowing and voluntary plea requirements." Julian A. Cook, III, All 
Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 
U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 883-84 (2004). And, "it has been suggested that Rule 11 plainly 
contemplates a unilateral approach because Rule 11 statutorily mandates defendant 
performance as a prerequisite to the receipt of his promised return." Id. at 884. Again, we 
believe that this is once again merely using the terms or definitions of "unilateral contract" 
and "bilateral contract" to describe the results already reached by the court. See United 
States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677-78 (1997). 
[T]he [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] nowhere state that the guilty 
plea and the plea agreement must be treated identically. Instead, they 
explicitly envision a situation in which the defendant performs his side of the 
bargain (the guilty plea) before the Government is required to perform its 
side (here, the motion to dismiss four counts). If the court accepts the 
agreement and thus the Government's promised performance, then the 
contemplated agreement is complete and the defendant gets the benefit of his 
bargain. But if the court rejects the Government's promised performance, 
then the agreement is terminated and the defendant has the right to back out 
of his promised performance (the guilty plea), just as a binding contractual 
duty may be extinguished by the nonoccurrence of a condition subsequent. 
Id. But see Pettit, supra note 129, at 569 ("Most judges ... choose unilateral contract 
analysis simply because it accords with their view that plea agreements between 
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disagree about moving toward negotiated land-use regulation. 170 
We "don't have a dog in that fight"-we are simply proposing 
that the move not be by bearded ladies via the Brooklyn 
Bridge. 171 
B. Employment Contracts: Modifying Employment-at-Will 
Most employment relationships are at-will. Under the 
employment-at-will doctrine-a doctrine that goes back to the 
late 1800s--either the employer or the employee can unilaterally 
terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any 
reason, or for no reason. 172 In the last twenty-five years, the 
employment-at-will doctrine has been restricted and modified by 
statutes and judicial decisions. 173 Some of these judicial 
decisions are based on .gublic policy; 174 others seem to rely on 
contract law concepts. 1 5 And many of the reported cases that 
use contract law concepts to restrict or modify the employment-
at-will doctrine use the terms "offer," ';J?romise," 
"consideration," "reliance," and "unilateral contract." 1 
prosecutors and criminal defendants do not call for the defendant to undertake any legally 
enforceable obligation to enter a plea."). 
170. See, e.g., Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A 
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive 
Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 270-71 
(2005). 
171. At first, Yvette, who was raised in New Jersey (and loves dogs) objected to our 
using that phrase in a law review article. Then I pointed out that the phrase appears twice 
in the same issue of the Michigan Law Review. See Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in 
Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1503 (2005); Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in 
the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1642 (2005). 
172. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 102-03 (4th ed. 200 l ). 
Most employees feel obliged to give notice in order to maintain their professional 
reputation and the possibility of future employment. Cf Amy Joyce, Exits Without Honor, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at F6. 
173. MURRAY, supra note 172, at 103-05; Teresa A. Cheek, The Employment-at-Will 
Doctrine in Delaware: A Survey, 6 DEL. L. REV. 311, 311 (2003); Susan R. Dana, South 
Dakota Employment at Will Doctrine: Twenty Years of Judicial Erosion, 49 S.D. L. REV. 
47, 47 (2003). 
174. MURRAY, supra note 172, at 103-04 & n.213; see, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 890-91 (Mich. 1980); Peter Linzer, The Decline 
of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 
20 GA. L. REV. 323 (1986). 
175. See infra notes 176-96 and accompanying text. 
176. See, e.g., Ryan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. Civ.A.03-CV-1674, 2004 WL 
2406689 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2004); Kaplan v. Aspen Knolls Corp., 290 F. Supp. 2d 335, 
337-39 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); cf Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling 
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The facts in the November 16, 2005 opinion in Long v. 
Copart of Connecticut, lnc. 177 are representative. The plaintiff 
employee sued for wrongful discharge, claiming that the 
defendant's employee handbook "'created a unilateral contract 
which altered her at-will employment status."' 178 More 
specifically, Ms. Long was arguing that: (1) the employee 
handbook was the employer's offer of employment and (2) her 
working pursuant to that offer was both the acceptance of the 
offer and the bargained-for consideration for the offer. 179 
Other law review commentary has discussed the obvious 
problems with such "unilateral contract" arguments by 
employees. 180 We prefer to discuss the nonobvious argument by 
employers that their continuing to provide employment in an 
employment at-will relationship turns what was an 
unenforceable illusory promise into an enforceable unilateral 
contract. 181 For example, in Lopez v. Ramirez, Ramirez agreed 
to transfer property to Lopez, his employer. 182 Ramirez later 
sued for a declaratory judgment that the agreement was void and 
unenforceable because all that he received in exchange for the 
Down: Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Ojferee 's Assent, 
32 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 382 (2002) ("Today, the vast majority of jurisdictions that 
recognize a handbook exception to at-will employment do so on the basis of unilateral 
contract theory."). 
177. No. 2:04 CV 298, 2005 WL 3087850 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2005). 
178. Id. at *2, *6. 
179. See id. at *6; cf MURRAY, supra note 172, at 103-05. 
180. See generally E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 
1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 206-09 (1990); Pettit, supra note 129, 
at 555-65. These articles focus on three problems: First, is the employee's handbook an 
offer, i.e., "a manifestation of [the employer's] willingness to enter into a bargain"? 
Second, is the employee's continuing to do what she was already doing-working for the 
employer--consideration, i.e., a bargained for exchange? Third, is the employee's 
handbook and the employer's continuing to work the kind of "induce[d] action or 
forbearance" that triggers promissory estoppel? See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 90, at 242. 
181. See Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 645 n.6 (1994). This 
is different from the more obvious situation in which the employer agrees to do something 
in addition to merely continuing employment and later does what she agreed to do. For 
example, in any employment-at-will, an employer promises to provide additional training 
and an employee promises not to compete after leaving. If the employer does provide the 
training, then the employer has accepted by performing and formed an enforceable 
unilateral contract. Cf RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 50{1), at 128; § 53(1), 
at 134 (1979). 
182. No. 13-04-379-CV, 2005 WL 1643933, at *I (Tex. App. July 14, 2005). 
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property was Lopez's offer of continued at-will employment. 183 
The court first acknowledged that an employer's promise of at-
will employment is illusory because in at-will employment the 
emplo~er has the option of terminating employment at any 
time. 1 4 Nonetheless, the court granted Lopez summary 
judgment, reasoning that, "Assuming that Lopez's promise to 
employ Ramirez ... is illusory, the parties formed a unilateral 
contract when Lopez actually provided ... employment .... " 185 
A recent Vermont case reached a similar result by using the 
language of "consideration," not "unilateral contract."186 
Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly involved the question of the 
enforceability of a covenant not to compete entered into during 
employment-at-will. 187 Kelly started work at Summits 7 in 
January 2000. 188 A year later, she signed a covenant not to 
compete. 189 In 2003, Kelly voluntarily left Summits 7 and went 
to work for a competitor. 190 These were good facts for the 
employer; they led to a good result for the employer. 
The Vermont Supreme Court identified consideration as the 
"primary issue." 191 The court concluded that "continued 
employment alone is sufficient192 consideration .... " 193 The 
majority opinion in Summits 7 was based not on policy, but 
precedent-"the majority of other courts, and the recent 
Restatement [of Employment] draft that continued employment 
alone is sufficient19 consideration to support a covenant not to 
compete entered into during an at-will employment 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at *2. 
185. Id. 
186. Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 886 A.2d 365, 373 (Vt. 2005). 
187. See id. at 367. 
188. Id. at 367-68. 
189. Id. at 368. 
190. Id. 
191. Summits 7, 886 A.2d at 372. 
192. We have never understood what the adjective "sufficient" adds to 
"consideration." Isn't a mere peppercorn enough? See Whitney v. Stearns, 1.6 Me. 394, 
396-97 (1839) (stating that even a mere peppercorn, given for value, can result in a 
contract); Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the 
Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 746 (1996). 
193. Summits 7, 886 A.2d at 372. 
194. Same "ticky" objection to the use of the adjective "sufficient" in describing 
consideration. See supra note 192. 
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relationship." 195 A strong dissent concluded that the approach 
of the majority of the Vermont Supreme Court (and the majority 
of other courts) was "illogical and unpersuasive. Whether there 
is adequate consideration should be judged based on the 
expectations of the parties at the time they enter into the 
agreement." 196 
Since the employer's argument in cases like Lopez or 
Summits 7 is based on what the employer does after the 
employee promise, the focus perhaps should be on promissory 
estoppel under Restatement Second section 90, not 
consideration. 197 Employer Summits 7 (or Lopez) could argue 
that its continuing to provide employment to Kelly (or Ramirez) 
after the promise not to compete (or to sell property) was 
(1) "action" that (2) promisor Kelly (or Ramirez) should 
"reasonably expect," and (3) "injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise."198 
Even more promising is enforcing the employee's promise 
under Professor Eisenberg's-the Gilbert wy-theory of 
enforcing promises that increase probability. 1 He uses the 
following example for illusory promises: 
Call the person who makes the real promise in an illusory 
promise transaction A, and call the person who makes the 
illusory promise B. In illusory promise cases ... the 
promisor, A, does not make a promise to B for nothing, as a 
gift. He makes it for something, as a bargain. A seeks to 
advance his own interests by increasing the probability of 
exchange. 
A makes his promise because he believes that B's 
incentives to exchange with A rather than with others 
would be insufficient unless the promise is made .... A has 
a degree of confidence in the attractiveness of his 
performance that he believes B does not share. A therefore 
195. Summits 7, 886 A.2d at 372. 
196. Id. at 376 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
197. Cf Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ind., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 121 
(Ind. 1994) (permitting use of promissory estoppel by employee); see also Cortlan H. 
Maddux, Comment, EMPLOYERS BEWARE! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel 
as an Exception to Employment at Will, 49 BAYLORL. REV. 197, 218 (1997). 
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90, at 242. 
199. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Probability and Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. 
REV. 1005, 1014 (1998). Even though the Gilbert author is Melvin A. Eisenberg, it is the 
same guy. 
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makes a promise to B that is intended to change B's 
incentives to exchange with A so as to increase the 
probability of exchange. A does this by making a 
commitment he believes will induce B to give A a chance 
to show that his performance is attractive .... 200 
According to Professor Eisenberg's theory, Kelly made the 
commitment not to compete so that Summits 7 would give her a 
greater chance to show the quality of her work; so, her 
commitment increased the probability of continued employment. 
Similarly, Ramirez made the commitment to transfer property to 
Lopez so that Lopez would give him a greater chance. In 
describing similar situations, Professor Eisenberg used the 
phrase "classical unilateral contracts."201 Again, however, the 
use of the phrase "unilateral contract" at best describes a result; 
it does not cause or even help reach the result. 202 
VI. A PARTING LOOK AT BEARDED LADIES 
AND THE BROOKLYN BRIDGE 
As Professor Eisenberg's article on chance and probability 
illustrates, contract law professors today, in both law review 
articles and books, are both creative and insightful in explaining 
bases for contract liability. A book review of a book on contract 
theory203 properly concludes that "[ c ]ontract theory suffers from 
an embarrassment of riches."204 In his day, Professor Langdell 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. It has been argued that contract law generally should not cause the result. 
Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 158 
(2005) ("Contract law, although not wholly incompatible with employment, does not fully 
account for the broad range of relational interests and contexts present in employment 
relationships."). 
203. The book on contract law theory is cleverly titled Contract Theory and is by 
Stephen A. Smith, not the ESPN commentator, but the McGill law professor. In an equally 
cleverly titled article on the influence of two decades of contract law scholarship on 
judicial rulings, Dr. Gregory Crespi begins with the statement, "Over the last two decades, 
a substantial and diverse body of contract law scholarship has been produced .... Much of 
this work is of a rather theoretical and abstract character." Gregory Scott Crespi, The 
Influence of Two Decades of Contract Law Scholarship on Judicial Rulings: An Empirical 
Analysis, 57 SMU L. REV. 105, 105 (2004). He concludes thirteen pages later that 
"[c]ontract law scholarship, and legal scholarship generally, probably does in fact have 
some modest influence on at least some judicial decisions." Id. at 118. 
204. Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 
1488 (2005) (reviewing STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY (2004)). 
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was creative and insightful in explaining that a combination of 
one person's words and another person's conduct could be a 
basis for contract liability and using the short phrase "unilateral 
contract" to describe such a contract. Nineteenth-century 
contract law scholarship did not suffer from an embarrassment 
of riches. 
The important question is how a court determines whether 
there is a contract, not whether courts continue to use the phrase 
"unilateral contract." Should the court be guided by economic 
theories of efficiency and welfare maximization, or rights-based 
theories of expectation and reliance? If the latter, a court should 
explain why words and/or acts205 are singled out and given legal 
significance. Do the words invite a bargained-for exchange or 
reliance or some combination of the two?206 Do the acts 
evidence a bargained-for exchange or reliance or some 
combination of the two? 
The words "unilateral contract" are no more important in 
answerin~ these "real world" questions than the words "Denny 
Crane."2 In the usual situation, it makes no difference whether 
a contract is formed by a promise for a promise or a promise for 
an act-whether the contract is unilateral or bilateral. 
"Unilateral contract" can help a court describe a contract based 
in part on conduct; it cannot help a court determine whether 
there is a legal basis for such a contract. 
This does not mean that unilateral contracts and the 
Brooklyn Bridge hypothetical are not an important part of the 
law school world. While we, like Llewellyn, believe that an 
offer to enter into a unilateral contract is as rare as a bearded 
lady on the Brooklyn Bridge208 or as a "fertile octogenarian,"209 
205. For a discussion of the philosophical approach called "speech act theory" that 
blends words and acts, see Tiersma, supra note 67, at 15-18. 
206. See Stoljar, supra note 31, at 534 (blending reliance together with bargain into 
reliance-bargain). 
207. Denny Crane is a character on the television series, Boston Legal (ABC 
television broadcast 2004-present). 
208. To borrow from the first President Clinton, the accuracy of our comparison of 
offers to enter into unilateral contracts and bearded ladies "depends on what the meaning of 
the word 'bearded' is." Cf Steven Lubet, The Importance of Being Honest, 8 GREEN BAG 
2D 163, 170 (2005) ("In his grand jury testimony, Clinton famously said, 'It depends on 
what the meaning of the word "is" is."'). There are still some offers to enter into unilateral 
contracts. Offers of rewards are offers still generally considered to be offers to enter into 
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generations of Arkansas law students had a much richer law 
school experience because of Wylie Davis' and Al Witte's use 
of Brooklyn Bridge hypotheticals in their contracts classes and 
Dick Atkinson's use of fertile octogenarian hypotheticals in his 
property classes. We hope that their successors at the University 
of Arkansas Law School and their counterparts Georgetown and 
SMU carry on. 
unilateral contracts. See generally Pablo Lerner, Promises of Rewards in a Comparative 
Perspective, 10 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 53 (2004). 
209. For those who had property professors less memorable than Richard Atkinson, 
the "fertile octogenarian," along with the "unborn widow," are fictitious creatures in the 
world of wills, trusts, and estates that possess the ability to violate the Rule Against 
Perpetuities and thus invalidate a trust. A "fertile octogenarian" relies on the legal (and 
with today's technological advances not entirely absurd) presumption of the fertility of a 
woman throughout her life, even a woman in her eighties. She may thus bear children long 
after the death of the grantor of the trust. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 798-801 (6th ed. 2000). 
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